'violence-prone' areas are expanding the so-called new risks are increasing on a global dimension, and the exact sources of the most dangerous forms of international terrorism remain diffuse. The EU needs a broader strategy.
In Brussels, the choice of means is undertaken according to Member States' interests and their ability to push through these interests at the EU level, which cannot always be generically determined. Only when confronted with a concrete situation will it become evident in how far the European actors feel affected, to what degree they want to become involved and what efforts they are actually capable of making. As is always the case, the ability to move forward on integration is dependent upon the Member States' political will.
In addition to the Member States however, one must also recognise how the agenda and priorities of the EU are often compelled by external circumstances. These circumstances include such diverse factors as the dramatic situation in the conflict area itself, media influences, campaigns of non-governmental actors and inquiries to 'Europe' by third parties, which the Brussels institutions and some of the more influential EU capitals cannot ignore.
Furthermore, global (UN, World Bank) and regional (OSCE, Council of Europe) organisations to which the EU itself belongs force the EU's hand, and that includes pressure on the part of the U.S.A. and other close partners. They all assume that the EU has a potentially strong intervention capability and can thus make a major European contribution to help alleviate international violent conflicts. Because of the numerous expectations, Brussels is relieved of the task of setting its own agenda, for the agenda is already overly full.
Adhering to this agenda allows the EU to increase its efficiency while pleasing third parties.
Finally, it becomes noticeable when considering conflict prevention activities that the Union's foreign and security policy is still in an initial and experimental phase. Thus topics on the EU agenda and what happens to them often (inadvertently) become test cases for Europeans' political unanimity, their decisiveness of action, their material independence and the professional execution. For s ome time, the area of conflict prevention 10 has been developing and is being tested as a new area of European security policy. What have the EU and its Member States set out to accomplish and how far do their ambitions reach? 11 These 10 In this study the term conflict prevention refers to efforts to restrain and prevent violent conflicts, before, during and/or after the outbreak of combat. According to this definition preventive policy is carried out through military and/or non-military means. Furthermore, conflict prevention is distinguished from the term crisis management which is used here so as to include military activities during the war-like phase of a conflict. In EU political practice, this distinction is not consistently used. Even if an EU action is primarily devoted to conflict prevention, it is often described (inaccurately) as crisis management. Military actions classifiable as pre-emptive strikes belong in their own category of conflict policy which for the purposes of this article is considered neither as conflict prevention nor as crisis management. questions are not only of empirical interest. As such diverse events as the forced regime change in Iraq and the debate in the European Convention demonstrate, the EU's image and influence in the rest of the world are at stake: Brussels cannot opt out.
Financial motivation: protecting the EU's investments
Contrary to common wisdom, conflict prevention is expensive, at least in all those cases where structural prevention is required and certainly in those cases where one wants to be sure that conflict prevention is successful. Is the EU prepared to accept that conflict prevention policy requires 'double' funding: first, for the build-up of those preventive capacities that the EU still lacks, and, second, for running the agenda of day-to-day cases of prevention. Looking at the huge cobweb of financial relations which the EU has built up over the last decades, it seems that both the money and the procedures are in place to support extensive policies of EU conflict prevention.
As the 2001 Report of the European Commission points out, financial assistance to third countries is one of the central components of the Union's external action, alongside trade policy and political dialogue. 12 It is thus an important tool for promoting the fundamental values of the EU and for meeting the global challenges of the twenty-first century, such as conflict prevention and peace building. Brussels is one of the major actors in international cooperation and development assistance, donating just over 8 billion EUR per year since 2001 (see the Overview 'External Action and Pre-accession Aid Budget'). Protecting that investment is an additional motivation for the European Union to be involved in conflict prevention, and in part, it counteracts the huge cost of involvement. Referring to T able 1 below, one can see that the vast majority of the External Action and Pre-accession Aid Budget is dedicated to regional co-operation and assistance, while a little less than a fourth of the Budget is reserved for food and humanitarian aid or other more general co-operation measures, such as the European initiative for democracy and human rights. Another interesting perspective that can be gained by looking at the chart is the fact that more than a third of the entire Budget is allotted to the Pre-accession strategy and aid. Resolving problems in those countries that may one day be members of the Union takes priority. Finally, the further away a region is from Europe, the less that region obtains in aid. In reality, the reverse should be true, given that the costs of stabilisation grow with the distance from Brussels. programme of measures to make significant improvements in the quality and the timely delivery of projects while ensuring robust financial management. This reform has been driven further to include security policy goals in EU programmes. The Commission demonstrated that even if the funding of such operations from the existing budget procedure has been over-bureaucratic in the past, the Community's budget remains the best way to fund operations because it is the best way of ensuring good governance and transparency and the coherence of the EU's actions under both the CFSP and the Community itself. 13 The question of financing may at first appear minute and simply a matter of bureaucratic reshuffling, but it is actually a matter of how projects should best be organised internally, so that they are efficient and well targeted externally.
In fact, good financial governance may well drive the EU's conflict prevention strategy and future agenda. Budget constraints are likely to raise more fundamental questions regarding alternative spending. EU governments may invest in de-escalation measures rather than crisis intervention or postwar reconstruction. They may want to launch prevention policies as a protection against capital loss of aid in case of civil war and devastation in developing countries.
Stimulated by competition -Inside and outside the Union
To have more influence in the day-to-day developments in conflict areas, however, the EU must expand its sphere of influence beyond that of humanitarian and financial assistance.
This will prove more complicated than one would hope. The complexity of the EU's conflict prevention policy was alluded to earlier, when both the interest of the Member States and that of external actors were cited as sources of influence for the EU's conflict prevention policy.
Co-ordinating both internally and externally is a difficult assignment, and one that the The shift of the main prevention activities from communitarian policies to CFSP/ESDP gives the Member States a larger share of the responsibility and the burden. They
do not yet rise to the occasion. Recently, some have worked at making progress on their own, single state prevention policy. 19 But it is those Member States which have not yet declared the prevention of violent conflicts a foreign, security and development policy priority which present a problem. The ir participation in improving conflict prevention policy at the EU level leaves much to be desired. They have no understanding whatsoever of the policy area, they have shown a lack of commitment in the wake of several critical cases, and they do not support EU institutions in the new and difficult field.
However, one must recognise that a certain reorientation has occurred. Some Member How can Member States be moved to assume more collective responsibility? Political will certainly cannot be forced through majority decisions in the Council, even though this path -especially in the light of an enlarged EU -should be widened wherever possible. It is more likely, however, that progress can be expected through an increased participation of 18 In its report, the Commission repeatedly refers to the Member States' obligation (loc. cit. 11). Commissioner
Nielson supported this view in a speech delivered in London. 'We cannot have a High Representative on the basis of a low common denominator. The 'C' in CFSP stands for 'Common' not 'Convenient'. A main obstacle to a credible European contribution to conflict prevention are the barely co-ordinated views expressed by member states. I would not be honest with you if I did not point to this obvious lack of political will in member states to accommodate the unity in messages which is absolutely crucial to the credibility of Europe's common Rather, the overriding experience has been that the various actors in conflict prevention are active without any co-ordination among each other. They co-ordinate neither the development of prevention strategies nor their execution. 21 Concerted action can most likely be found among declarations of intent. The EU runs into international competition when trying to raise its international status.
The EU has supported the UN Secretary-General and participated in the dialogue with representatives of the UN system. This dialogue has been encouraged during the last decade primarily with the international financial institutions (World Bank, IMF), but has also always dwindled again. Reasons can be found on both sides. Currently it does not seem like the HR or the Commission will be able to sustain and substantiate this dialogue. This is to a large extent, but not entirely, a question of external representation and of the international legal personality of the EU -an issue that was rightfully taken up at the Convention and is evident in the draft EU Constitution. The international financial institutions are partially not capable of prevention because their bylaws explicitly forbid them from intervening in political conflicts, leaving them to concentrate on reconstruction.
On a positive note, the EU has successfully used the G8, in which the EU is represented several-fold (four Member States, presidency, Commission) as a forum for the definition and promotion of the preventative concept, but also for concrete issues (small firearms control, the diamond trade, child soldiers, etc.). Thanks primarily to the EU 21 The heads of state and government have realised ever since passing the European Programme that the EU must seek co-operation with other international actors: 'The EU must build and sustain mutually reinforcing and effective partnerships for prevention with the UN, the OSCE and other international and regional organisations as well as civil society. Increased co-operation is needed at all levels, from early warning and analysis to action and evaluation. Field co-ordination is of particular importance. EU action should be guided by principles of value added and comparative advantage.' (European Programme, loc. cit. 7, p. 10).
representatives, the G8 heads of state and government present new initiatives year by year (from Okinawa to Genoa, from Kananaskis to Evian) reminding those in power that world wide conflict prevention needs improvement, emphasising the role of the UN Charter and advocating the sustainable strengthening of democracy, human rights and the rule of law.
Although the G8 regularly goes through the agenda of the most important regional crises, there was little inclination on the part of the participating EU Member States and the Commission to give the group an operative conflict prevention task.
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In the EU dialogue with regional organisatio ns modest progress has been made, cases should help to make a preliminary assessment. The EU has not yet u ndertaken a systematic evaluation of its interventions, thus making it difficult to assess the performance of the Rapid Reaction Mechanism. In the case of Iraq, the EU's support for the stabilisation process is more conditional than was the case for Afghanistan, with very much depending upon the final draft of a possible UN Resolution. See http://www.un.org/apps/news/infocusRel.asp?infocusID=50&Body=Iraq&Body1=inspect# for the most recent developments in the UN. 33 In this context, a statement made by Commissioner Patten in the aftermath of September 11 th is telling: 'We can and should aim to facilitate a political settlement and having facilitated it we then walk away. We have to make sure that a better government which will emerge from that sad embittered country will be able to count on the long-term support of the international community to rebuild in the ruin of the medieval ferocity which has been unleashed on Afghanistan for the last few years.' In European Commission Statement on the Situation in Afghanistan, 2 October 2001. On 13 December 2001, the Commission decided a financial package of EURO 4.9 Million as a RRM to begin the political, economic and social (re)construction in Afghanistan and affected neighbour states. In the spring of 2002, EU representatives in Afghanistan were faced with the task of sensibly using EUR 200 million collected from different programmes. The funds were allocated for reconstruction The EU's influence seems to be greatest if the country of intervention has some justifiable hope of joining the EU one day. That is certainly the case in the Western Balkans, and this can especially be seen in Macedonia, where the distant hope of future EU membership was paired with well developed prevention and crisis management. As a more in-depth analysis of the EU's function in the Macedonia conflict shows, the EU, thanks to Solana and his staff, could for the first time assume both in Brussels and in the field decisive co-ordinating and mediation tasks.
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Supported by a special envoy and equipped with a flexible mandate from the Member States, Solana was able to assert the EU's authority towards the conflicting parties and in its co-operation with other actors, especially NATO and the U.SA. Weaknesses of earlier prevention attempts were also overcome in this case. Via RRM, immediate action resources were available. There was the necessary co-ordination between the short-term diplo matic missions of the The concerted action of the World Bank and other donor organisations can be assessed similarly. In all of these cases, the influence potential of the EU was increased through conditioned offers to the conflicting parties.
The lessons learned from postwar situations in Bosnia and Kosovo could also be applied by the EU to the preventive activities in Macedonia: an important prerequisite for successful intervention is that the international actors have a coherent concept, co-ordinate their efforts and use their respective strengths in a division of labour. 37 Finally, a 'lead agency' which takes the initiative and keeps the process going seems to be indispensable. regional co-operation, has not fully used this instrument for prevention purposes. Yet the regional approach to conflict prevention seems to be a valuable one as it can combine both the geographical and the functional approach.
Functional prevention activities: building international regimes
As when dealing with regional prevention cases, the EU approaches horizontal tasks by concentrating on a few selected areas. In these cases, it is mo re difficult to determine the degree of success. It may already be considered a success that the EU best recognises the common causes of individual instances of violent escalation and the factors regularly responsible for the outbreak of civil wars, the proliferation of militant rebellion and repression and that in some regions, these phenomena cannot be stopped. The EU devotes itself less systematically here to fighting the root causes than it does when dealing with local and regional conflicts. This is indicated by the fact that there is no urgent agenda at the presidency level for horizontal issues. Nevertheless, EU activities in this field are both quantitatively and qualitatively quite impressive. They should be seen as the functiona l correlation to the list of individual conflict cases (see above).
The list of functional problem areas that the EU has recently devoted itself to includes:
the scarcity of certain resources (land, fuel, water), inequalities of economic distribution The EU rightly assumes that these horizontal factors cannot be combated only on a regional level but must be dealt with globally. There are a number of plausible explanations for this. Beyond merely treating the symptoms that arise in conflict areas, it is desirable to bring about sustainable changes specifically in the struc ture of the governments, in the society and furthermore in the conflicting parties' attitudes. Without such a frame of reference, it would be impossible to obtain support from such international organisations as the World Bank. However, influencing the dynamics of the local conflict area alone is not enough; in order to achieve long-term reorientation, the immediate environment of the region must be Experiences from such initiatives at functional conflict prevention have also proven valuable for all other ho rizontal activities. Part of the lessons learnt is the sober fact that the good intentions connected with conflict prevention may turn out to be untrue or may lead -in some cases -to a negative impact. Even the panacea of democratic development 44 must be reevaluated in terms of whether it does not actually accentuate the conflicting parties'
antagonisms towards each other instead of leading them towards peaceful competition.
Similarly, the effect of the media in conflicts can be ambivalent; at times it can glorify violence, but also, as independent sources of information, it can guarantee transparency. It can dangerously exaggerate ethnic differences but also foster dialogue between different ethnic groups. Even more critical is the question, or even unspoken reproach, that the EU's development policy could itself contribute to the escalation of local conflicts. The notorious incompetence of local partners gives birth to the justified fear that Brussels could inadvertently help anchor repressive structures in certain countries because of the necessity of co-operating with whoever is in power. That is why the issues of good governance and the emphasis of participatory politics are increasingly significant.
Pitfalls and deficiencies of the above-mentioned kind are not only limited to functional conflict prevention. It must be assumed that they occur in cases of acute and regional preventative activities as well. This is not a motivating environment. Disillusionment must be 44 This is not the place to evaluate individual human rights or other programmes. But it is necessary to mention at least in passing that some of these programmes have become alarmingly reduced to rote, assembly-line activities. The often cited example of Brussels' praised first measure for the democratisation of Congo -the purchase of several hundred ballot boxes -is no exaggeration. Naturally, a group of merchants has emerged, considered as a limiting factor when planning to extend investments in conflict prevention. It would be wrong to conclude that prevention does not work, rather the lessons should be used to do better and to improve the record. Prevention is a profession with a long learning curve.
RAISING THE STAKES AND MAKING USE OF THE UNION'S ASSETS
As the results of the first phase of targeted prevention activities show, the EU is still in the infant stages of a learning process in terms of a systematic and successful conflict prevention policy. Although it has introduced the concept of conflict prevention into all its institutions and was able to shorten the span from conflict warning to early action, the measures taken and their actual effects remain modest. Either the measures were taken in geographical proximity (the Balkans) or they affected horizontal issues of a limited range (small arms code of conduct). An intensive examination of each case and topic that the EU has dealt with in the context of conflict prevention could he lp the EU to more selectively widen the arsenal of conflict prevention instruments and to develop a more efficient prevention strategy in the future.
The rather chequered balance sheet could also be due to the fact that it is simply too early, and the fruits of the most recent reforms still have to grow before progress is more recognisable. On the other hand, it cannot be denied that introduced internal changes are too weak for a number of reasons to consistently retool the EU as a conflict prevention actor and prepare it for an internationally significant role. The c reation of capabilities, procedural agreement, joint declarations and actions of the Fifteen are already hailed as successes. The actual effects of these achievements in the conflict areas themselves are a different story.
Indeed, the EU shies away from the difficult violent conflicts (such as Chechnya) or curbing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (as in North Korea).
It seems that the arsenal of motivation which drives the EU to run more ambitious conflict prevention activities is not strong enough to allow for wider risk taking and to focus more on the outcome than on the output of its policies. From the start, the EU has set its sights on a lower level of addressing int ernational conflict. Brussels did not aspire to the role of a leading power in the area of conflict prevention. It seems driven by the restrictions of its operative options rather than by the strategic reach of its responsibilities. The Union talks abundantly about its particular assets, but it forgets to use them.
specialised in the market these 'immediate actions' have created.
